INTRODUCTION
The past decade has seen South Africa's apparently generous asylum and refugee system flounder, characterized by ever-growing wait times for status decisions, increased barriers for application and renewal of permits, and growing disregard for refugee law and court orders. 1 The South African government has increasingly taken the position that the country's post-apartheid refugee protection legislation is far too generous and needs to be revised in the direction of greater restrictions and fewer rights. This has resulted in major changes to the 1998 Refugees Act in the 2016 Refugees Amendment Act, and the indication of a new restrictive approach to refugee protection in the 2017 White Paper on International Migration in South Africa. 2 Both developments seek to bring South Africa in line with the exclusionary policies towards asylum-seekers and refugees seen in many other countries globally. 3 In the absence of material support from the South African government or the UNHCR, one of the primary livelihood strategies of asylum-seekers and refugees in the country has been to create work for themselves in the informal sector. The policy environment in which refugee entrepreneurs run informal businesses on the streets and in residential areas is not governed by refugee legislation but by national, provincial and local policies towards the informal sector. Those working in the informal sector face an ambiguous policy environment that has occasionally supported but largely ignored, and at times actively destroyed, informal sector livelihoods and those of migrant and refugee businesses in particular.
To fully understand the policy environment within which migrants and refugees establish and operate their enterprises in the South African informal sector, we need to bring together two streams of policy analysis. The first concerns South Africa's changing refugee policies and practices and the erosion of the protective and progressive refugee policy approach that characterized the immediate post-apartheid period. 4 The second concerns the highly ambiguous post-apartheid informal sector policy, which oscillates between tolerance and attempted destruction at national and municipal levels. While there have been longstanding tensions between foreign and South African informal sector operators, an overtly anti-foreign migrant sentiment has increasingly been expressed in official policy and practice.
This report underlines the need for both a rights-based asylum system and more progressive policies towards the informal sector. Refugee entrepreneurs and service providers rendering south africa undesirable: a critique of refugee and informal sector policy agree that obtaining refugee status is key to enabling refugee entrepreneurship and sustainable livelihoods. While this status should mark a signpost to successful local integration, the South African government continues to pile on administrative and logistical barriers to the asylum process and prospective refugees. These measures add to the ambiguity around migration management in the country and complicate the prospects for refugees to provide for themselves in a safe and sustainable manner.
The report is based on a review of media and official government sources, published and grey literature, and interviews with key informants in the city of Cape Town and the provinces of Limpopo and Gauteng during 2015. A total of 30 in-depth interviews were conducted including with researchers, refugee and diaspora associations, refugee rights NGOs, law enforcement, the City of Cape Town and Western Cape governments, and international organizations such as the IOM and UNHCR. Interviews were also conducted with national government departments including Home Affairs, Labour, and Small Business Development.
REFUGEE POLICY AND PRACTICE
South Africa is a signatory to the 1951 United Nations Convention on the Status of Refugees and the 1969 OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa. Since the end of apartheid, it has built a reputation as a protective and progressive refugee-receiving country. South Africa's 1998 Refugees Act integrated international refugee protections into domestic law and exceeded international standards in important respects. The Act made generous allowances for freedom of movement, access to health and education services, some social protection, and the right to work. Most notably, it Act embraced local integration over encampment, which was a progressive choice in Africa at the time. 5 Underpinning the Act was a political and ideological approach which posited that refugees were permitted and fully expected to integrate temporarily into the host country and benefit from all attendant protections and rights granted to citizens by the Constitution. Refugees who had been in the country for five years were entitled to apply for permanent residence. In exchange for these progressive policies, both government and the UNHCR incurred minimal costs in providing material support for asylum-seekers and refugees in the country. migration policy series no. 79 In the years since these somewhat idealistic beginnings, South Africa has seen a distinct deterioration in the rights-based approach to refugee protection. 6 International praise for South Africa's liberal approach has been eroded by chronic processing delays, poor and illinformed adjudication, and the corruption and mismanagement that has become endemic to the asylum process. South Africa has one of the longest asylum adjudication periods in the world, with some cases stretching out for many years. After 2007, the economic meltdown in Zimbabwe imposed significant pressure on the asylum system as migrants from Zimbabwe moved in large numbers to South Africa. 7 South Africa's failure to anticipate and account for the entry of Zimbabweans created a situation whereby the asylum system became contorted into something of a "catch all" for generalized migration into South Africa. 8 While Zimbabwean migrants have subsequently been criticized by the South African government for "abusing" and overloading the asylum process, they had no other options for legal stay in South Africa. They were in fact encouraged to use the system by the establishment of a Refugee Reception Office in Musina by the Department of Home Affairs (DHA), specifically to speed up the issue of asylum-seeker permits to Zimbabweans.
Those close to the process argue that the demand for a place in South Africa's asylum queue, with its attendant right to work, rendered the system ineffectual in conducting legitimate refugee adjudication. This translated into increasingly strident denunciations of "bogus" claimants and "abuse of the system" by economic migrants. As the Minister of Home Affairs observed in a speech on World Refugee Day in 2016: "An unintended consequence of our liberal asylum regime has been that migrants who are not genuine refugees but are seeking economic opportunities have used it to attempt to regularise their stay in South Africa. The sheer volume of applications from these migrants has placed an enormous burden on the refugee status determination process, which has disadvantaged genuine asylum seekers by delaying their decisions, in the past taking years where they should take no more than 6 months". 9 The official line is that 90% of asylum-seekers are economic migrants, although there is no evidential basis for this claim (other than the fact that only about 10% of asylum-seekers to date have been granted refugee status). 10 However, this conclusion is a non-sequitur, given the arbitrariness of many decisions and the practice of adjudicating claims by country or origin and not the personal experience of the individual claimant.
11
The fact that the rejection rate is also a function of a system that is under-resourced, staffed by small numbers of poorly trained officers and rife with corruption, is unacknowledged. rendering south africa undesirable: a critique of refugee and informal sector policy 6 The reasons for this shift from rights and protections towards exclusion and control are seen by some as the inevitable consequence of life in a country where the majority still struggle to meet basic needs and there is competition for scarce public resources such as education, health care, and shelter, as well as employment and other livelihood opportunities. 12 In this zero sum game, every advantage that a refugee or asylum-seeker enjoys necessarily disadvantages a South African. However, at least one recent study has argued that South Africans do not oppose refugee protection for reasons of economic self-interest. 13 Rather their opposition is further evidence of the xenophobic character of South African society, with the attendant failure to acknowledge the positive economic, social and cultural contribution that refugees and asylum-seekers make to the country. 14 As the study concludes, "public animosity towards refugees in South Africa has motivated anti-immigrant riots, violence, and prejudice which has negatively impacted on refugee protection. " 15 As a result, "a protection strategy dedicated to maximizing refugees' freedom and integration may prove politically untenable in an era of pronounced anti-immigrant hostilities. " 16 Government argues that the breakdown of the refugee protection system in South Africa, and the need for reform, is because it has been overwhelmed by economic migrants.
For a period, the DHA argued that there were a million asylum-seekers in the country, a figure that was uncritically reproduced by the UNHCR and the media and translated into bogus claims that South Africa was the leading global destination for refugees. The White Paper on International Migration admits that this figure is erroneous, noting that in 2015, only 78,339 asylum-seeker (Section 22) permits were still active. 17 This revised figure is a considerable climb-down by the DHA and hardly justifies the image it promulgated of a system swamped. 18 Nor does it justify the draconian amendments to the law in process.
Rather than being motivated by a need to address an overburdened system, therefore, the narrowing of refugee rights and imposition of additional limitations on the ability of refugees to find safety and security in South Africa are better interpreted as an effort to make the country an undesirable destination for asylum-seekers and refugees. Several inter-con- Plans have been drawn up for the location and physical infrastructure of detention centres close to South Africa's borders with Zimbabwe and Mozambique and construction has apparently begun on a detention centre at Lebombo. 20 The White Paper notes that these detention centres are intended to accommodate all asylum-seekers during their status determination process. 21 Freedom of movement and integration into local communities (as at present) would be halted. So-called "low risk" asylum-seekers might be released into the care of national or international organizations and family or community members who would have to provide guarantees of support that excluded employment. Asylum-seekers would be deprived of the court-mandated right they have at present to work or study "since their basic needs will be catered for in the processing centres. " 22 To pre-empt the inevitable, and justifiable, criticism that South Africa is introducing a policy of encampment, the earlier Green Paper awkwardly asserted that "these centres should not be considered as contrary to the policy of non-encampment but as centres for mitigating security risks posed by irregular migration" (DHA, 2016: 66) . The claim that this somehow represents a continuation of the country's non-encampment policy is disingenuous. Under this policy, asylum-seekers will be sequestered in detention centres for the duration of the adjudication process, which is unrealistically envisioned as a 60 to 90-day process. Whether that process takes place within the proposed period or not, asylum-seekers would be fully dependent on government or international organizations for food, shelter, health care, education and other basic needs. The cost of constructing and maintaining detention centres for large numbers of asylum-seekers will be massive and UNHCR has indicated that it will not underwrite detention costs despite appeals from the South African government (which previously constrained the UNHCR from offering material assistance to asylum-seekers).
If South Africa faced an influx of asylum-seekers in the future akin to the over 200,000
Zimbabweans between 2006 and 2009, it is difficult to see how these centres would cope.
The second major strategy to turn the country into an undesirable destination for refugees is to put in place procedural, administrative and logistical hurdles that complicate an already tenuous status and sustainability. In contrast, the Cape Town High Court decided that the Cape Town RRO could remain closed. Because of the controversy, the 2016 Refugees Amendment Act gives the Director General of Home Affairs new powers to "dis-establish" any RRO and to force a whole category of asylum-seeker (defined in terms of country of origin or "a particular gender, religion, nationality, political opinion or social group") to report at designated RROs.
The associated administrative requirement that asylum-seekers must renew their permits every one to six months at the RRO where they obtained their permit (rather than an ordinary Home Affairs Office) imposes considerable financial and other hardships. The renewal period appears to be arbitrary and, according to some refugees, depends on the size of the bribe that they are willing to pay. Individuals and families who have found safety, shelter, work or school in another part of the country are forced to travel to the RRO to ensure that their status remains intact. Furthermore, wait times for receiving or renewing a permit are considerable. The scene outside the Marabastad (Pretoria) RRO was described by one key informant as follows: In a situation where asylum-seekers are almost exclusively self-supporting, without the assistance of government or the international community, they are forced to sacrifice valuable time and money, risk jeopardizing their jobs, and have to travel with or leave young children behind. Under the 2016 Act, failure to renew an asylum-seeker permit within one month of expiry will lead to automatic revocation of status, forfeiture of the right to renewal, and treatment as an "illegal foreigner" in terms of the Immigration Act (that is, summary arrest and deportation). Asylum-seekers whose claims are refused are also to be treated as "illegal foreigners". An asylum-seeker with an expired permit will also be guilty of an offence and liable to a fine and imprisonment of up to five years or both. Any individual or group of asylum-seekers or refugees can be arrested and deported on the vaguelyworded grounds of "national interest or public order. " migration policy series no. 79 The third strategy to undermine the rights of asylum-seekers and refugees and to make South Africa an undesirable place of refuge, is to undercut court judgments affirming the right of asylum-seekers and refugees to employment and self-employment. The 2016 Act explicitly seeks to overturn a judgment that permitted asylum-seekers to work in South Africa while awaiting adjudication of their claims. The onus will now be on "family and friends" to support asylum-seekers for their first four months in the country. If such support is not available, the UNHCR and NGOs are permitted to provide "shelter and basic necessities. " In both situations, the asylum-seeker is prohibited from working, while government assumes no responsibility for their care and protection. The government-appointed Standing Committee on Refugee Affairs is also empowered to decide unilaterally under what conditions asylum-seekers may work or study. If they are permitted to work or study, they are required to provide a letter from the employer or institution within 14 days from the date of employment or enrolment. The employer or institution can be fined ZAR20,000 if they fail to provide the documentation in the prescribed period. The right to work can also be revoked by the Director General. The Act says nothing about the right to access informal work and self-employment, which was a key component of earlier court judgments.
The fourth strategy in rendering South Africa undesirable is to ensure that protection is always temporary by making it extremely difficult for refugees to progress to permanent residence and eventual citizenship. The 1998 Act stated that refugees were entitled to apply for permanent residence after five years' continuous residence in South Africa and refugees "of good and sound character" could be issued with permanent residence permits irrespective of the length of sojourn in the country. This is one reason why the maximum length of a refugee (Section 24) permit was four years. The 2016 Act gives the Minister of Home Affairs new powers to issue an order that ceases recognition of an individual refugee or group of refugees or to revoke refugee status without the obligation to provide justification for such an action. The right of a refugee to apply for permanent residence has also been extended from five to 10 years. The White Paper proposes to do away with the category of permanent residence altogether and replace it with a long-term, renewable residence visa, for which refugees would become eligible after 10 years. It also seeks to sever any connection between length of residence and citizenship eligibility. 24 The recent case of long-term Angolan refugees in South Africa provides an instructive example of the official thinking underlying the current drive to choke the refugee path to permanent residence. In 2013, the Department of Home Affairs stripped all refugees from rendering south africa undesirable: a critique of refugee and informal sector policy Angola of their refugee status irrespective of length of residence and then, under protest, issued them with two-year non-renewable temporary residence permits (called Angolan Cessation Permits or ACPs). 25 In 2016, after extensive negotiations between human rights advocates and the DHA, the department finally agreed that former Angolan refugees could apply for permanent residence. The Western Cape High Court then issued an order by which all former Angolan refugees with expired ACPs could apply for permanent residence. In February 2017, the Scalabrini Centre of Cape Town submitted 1,757 applications on behalf of Angolan refugees to the DHA. The successful court action not only prevents the summary deportation of former Angolan refugees but could potentially provide an important precedent for future cases of cessation. The White Paper attempts to ensure that this will never happen.
Finally, prior to 2010, the Financial Intelligence Centre Act (FICA) prohibited refugees and asylum-seekers from opening bank accounts in South Africa. That policy was later relaxed but FICA's anti-money-laundering provisions still require banks to verify the identity of persons wanting to open a bank account. Banks are given wide discretion as to how they implement the requirements, with the result that many refuse to open accounts for refugees and asylum-seekers. In response to legal action, the DHA and FICA agreed that the department would provide banks with the means to verify the authenticity of refugee and asylum permits. In practice, opening a bank account remains a challenge for refugees and asylum-seekers, with banks remaining distrustful of DHA documentation. There have also been instances of refugees and asylum-seekers having their assets frozen when identity documents have not been renewed on time, when identity documents change, or when the DHA has failed to respond to verification enquiries in a timely manner. A frozen bank account raises grave protection concerns, threatening the ability to pay rent, buy food, care for children, and even cover costs for long-distance travel for the purposes of renewing status documentation. 26 Because of these difficulties, refugees and asylum-seekers tend to carry large amounts of cash, making them ready targets for theft. Refugees and asylumseekers also find it extremely difficult to obtain bank loans to start a business or for ongoing operations. Only 1% had managed to secure a bank loan to start a business in a recent SAMP survey of over 1,000 refugee-owned informal businesses. The refusal rate was 75%-80%. While it would be incorrect to suggest that banks are colluding in the project to make South Africa an undesirable destination, their actions certainly have that effect. migration policy series no. 79
INFORMAL SECTOR POLICY AND PRACTICE
Most asylum-seekers and refugees have little choice but to work in the informal sector in South Africa. If the proposals to prohibit asylum-seekers from working legally become law, this will have a major impact on the sector. A 2015 SAMP survey of 1,132 informal businesses run by migrants in Cape Town and Johannesburg found that 18% were refugee (Section 24) permit holders and 30% were asylum-seeker (Section 22) permit holders. 27 Depriving asylum-seekers (present and future) of the right to self-employment in the informal sector will undoubtedly lead to further court challenges but the intent is clearly to reduce the number of asylum-seekers coming to South Africa and the number of foreignowned enterprises in the sector. This would be consistent with the general aim of rendering South Africa an undesirable destination, but would also further national and local informal sector policy. These policies are increasingly focused on demonizing non-South Africans and forcing them off the streets and out of the low-income communities where they play a central role in making food and other consumables accessible to the urban poor.
Under apartheid, black South Africans were forbidden from engaging in informal businesses and access to business premises was strictly regulated. Influx control laws became increasingly unenforceable in the mid-1980s and were abolished in 1986. In 1987, the National White Paper on Privatisation and Deregulation introduced a more tolerant approach to black small business as part of a broader new economic philosophy informed by the Reagan-Thatcher era of deregulation. The change of attitude culminated in the Businesses Act 71 of 1991 (which repealed numerous restrictive laws and secured a more liberal approach to business licencing, premises and hours for both formal and informal business).
This legislation was a key measure for removing barriers to the operation of informal activities and was, in effect, a complete reversal of the apartheid approach.
After the passage of the 1991 Act, informal-sector activities increased in all cities and towns. Local authorities, however, complained that they were unable to cope, particularly with the growth of informal trading in public spaces. This led to the Businesses Amendment Act 186 of 1993 which gave provinces the discretion to develop their own legislation and allowed local authorities to formulate street-trading bylaws, and declare restricted and prohibited trade zones. Since then, local authorities across the country have promulgated such bylaws in near mirror images of one another. In all major metropoles, the sanctions for violation were inappropriately criminalized -either a fine or imprisonment -indicating a punitive approach to informal sector management. In 2004, a comprehensive review of the impact of the post-apartheid SMME programmes concluded that "existing government SMME programmes largely have been biased towards the groups of small and medium-sized enterprises and to a large extent have by-passed micro-enterprises and the informal economy. " 28 An evaluation of the government's skills development system concluded similarly that those working in the informal sector had "fallen into the gap" between small businesses and the unemployed. 29 These findings were echoed in an informal-sector budget analysis and confirmed by survey data conducted with informal-sector operators in Johannesburg and Durban. 30 In 2003, President Mbeki publicly advocated for the idea of the "second economy" in an address to the National Council of Provinces. Mbeki's negative view of the second economy saw it as characterized by "underdevelopment, contributes little to GDP, contains a large percentage of our population, incorporates the poorest of our rural and urban poor, is structurally disconnected from both the first and the global economy, and is incapable of self-generated growth and development. " 31 According to Mbeki, the second economy required "the infusion of capital and other resources by the democratic state to ensure the integration of this economy within the developed sector. " Although the concept of a second economy was not novel, its application to South Africa was an important moment in raising the public policy profile of the informal sector. The whole idea of a second economy elicited a flurry of criticism, however. 32 According to one critic, second-economy arguments were migration policy series no. 79 based on the premise that "the mainstream of the economy is working rather well, and government action is needed to enhance the linkages between the first and second economy and where appropriate to provide relief, such as public works programmes, to those locked into the informal economy. " The NDP's ideal scenario projects that 11 million jobs will be created by 2030, suggesting that 90% of these new jobs will be created by small and growing enterprises. Of these, the informal sector (and domestic work) will create between 1.2 million and 2.1 million new jobs. 36 However, the NDP chapter on the economy says nothing about strategies for the informal sector per se, how existing operators in the informal sector will be supported, and how barriers to entry will be addressed to help generate new jobs.
Also in 2012, the DTI established a new directorate for Informal Business and Chamber
Support. This constituted a recognition by the DTI of the role of the informal sector in broadening economic participation. 37 By the end of the year, the directorate had established a reference group charged with developing a National Informal Business Development Strategic Framework. Under the guidance of the reference group, DTI staff conducted consultations with stakeholders in the informal sector, formal business, and local government officials over a few months, and reported back to the reference group in February 2013. This led to the launch of the National Informal Business Upliftment Strategy (NIBUS) in 2014. 38 In the same period, and apparently unbeknown to the reference group, another section of the DTI was working under the Minister's direction on new legislation to replace the Businesses Amendment Act of 1993.
rendering south africa undesirable: a critique of refugee and informal sector policy
In March 2013, the DTI released a draft Business Licensing Bill. 39 The Bill's stated aim was "to provide for a simple and enabling framework for procedures for application of business licences by setting norms and standards. " 40 The DTI Minister, Rob Davies, later claimed that the Bill was put in place to deal with illegal trading practices, citing illegal imports, sub-standard goods, counterfeit goods, and illegal drug and liquor trading. In fact, as critics pointed out, these were already adequately dealt with through other laws such as the Customs and Excise Act of 1964, the Foodstuffs, Cosmetics, and Disinfectants Act of 1972, Counterfeit Goods Act of 1997, Drugs and Drug Trafficking Act of 1992 and a raft of provincial level legislation aimed at regulating (through the issuing of licences) informal liquor outlets or shebeens. 41 Where the NIBUS and the draft Business Licensing Bill converge is their common attitude towards migrants and refugees running small businesses in the informal economy.
Essentially, both attempt to regulate, control and exclude participation by non-South Africans. The NIBUS is characterized by implicit and explicit anti-migrant sentiment. It states that foreign-owned informal businesses are an "express challenge" since there is "no regulatory restrictions in controlling the influx of foreigners (sic)" and "no synergy between the DTI and Home Affairs in devising strategies and policies to control foreign business activities. " 42 It identifies a supposed "foreign trader challenge" in the informal sector, noting that "there is evidence of violence and unhappiness of local communities with regard to the takeover of local business by foreign nationals" [our emphasis]. 43 There are numerous complementary suggestions to strengthen South African informal sector businesses.
To reduce the "xenophobia associated with foreign national traders, " the NIBUS proposes to "influence the type of businesses that foreign nationals should run and the demarcated areas where these businesses should be active. " 44 As precedent for an exclusionary policy, NIBUS cites the Ghana Investment Promotion Centre Act, which has reserved selling at markets, petty trading and hawking, and the operation of metered taxis, car hire services, beauty salons and barber shops to nationals only, as well as India and Malaysia's restrictions on foreign economic participation. 45 The Department of Home Affairs is also criticized for supposedly having "no regulatory restrictions in controlling the influx of foreigners. " 46 One assessment concluded that "NIBUS is a pro-development approach for South African informal entrepreneurs which is allied to an anti-developmental agenda towards migrant entrepreneurs. " Bill…would take us back to the era of forced removals. " 49 The impossible conditions imposed on migrants and refugees for accessing a licence would have meant that few migrant informal operators would qualify and most would therefore be criminalized. Indeed, it has been argued that the Bill was introduced to regulate foreign migrants out of the sector in the interests of their South African counterparts. 50 To understand the anti-migrant content of the NIBUS and Draft Bill, it is important to appreciate the upsurge of animosity towards refugees and asylum-seekers among South African-owned businesses. 51 Both can be seen as a policy response to the complaints of these operators and the pressure on government to act. They can also be seen as a response to the phenomenon of "violent entrepreneurship"; that is, South Africans taking the law into their own hands and organizing attacks on refugee businesses. Instead of offering and providing protection to those at risk, the DTI reached the conclusion that it would be better to adopt the xenophobic rhetoric of the streets, cast refugees and asylum-seekers as a threat, and implement policies to try to get them out of the informal sector. These attitudes and responses to refugees and asylum-seekers in the informal sector were certainly not rendering south africa undesirable: a critique of refugee and informal sector policy confined to the DTI and DHA, and became particularly apparent in the response to a wave of violent xenophobic attacks in early 2015.
The major government response to the 2015 violence was the establishment of an InterMinisterial Committee on Migration (IMC) housed in the Presidency, on which 15 government ministers sat. The IMC concluded that the primary cause of the violence against foreign nationals was "increased competition arising from the socio-economic circumstances in South Africa. " 52 The total number of migrants in the country was grossly exaggerated at between five million and six million. It was thus "highly likely" that immigrants represented more than 10% of the country's population. Foreign nationals were supposedly placing a strain on government services such as health, housing, education and social grants and "dominating trade in certain sectors such as consumable goods in informal settlements which has had a negative impact on unemployed and low skilled South Africans. " The IMC also referred to the "business models used by migrants to discourage competition such as forming monopolies, evading taxes, avoiding customs and selling illegal and expired goods. " What we found astonishing was the Operation Fiela response from government.
They said the appropriate response (to xenophobia) is multi-agency enforcement to identify and address and detain and deport undocumented migrants and the justification was that South Africans are concerned about large numbers of undocumented migrants and involvement in crime and threats to social cohesion. So the best way to address the issue was to remove them. It emphasised the growing securitisation of migration -the language they used was national security language and moved away from rights language.
With regard, specifically, to the violence against foreign-owned businesses, government has been extremely responsive to arguments that these businesses are providing "unfair" competition and putting South Africans out of business. Whether this is true or not has never been ascertained and research evidence about the positive economic impacts of migrant and refugee business activity is strategically ignored.
In 2014, a Department of Small Business Development was hived off from the DTI to identify a strategy to manage the informal sector and encourage SMME development. The new Minister initially acknowledged the right of international migrants to operate when she stated that "they must make a living. The more they make a living, the more they contribute to the economy. They pay taxes and are active participants in the economy. " 55 This quickly changed to an emphasis on the negative impacts on South Africans of "foreigners. " By 2015, for example, she was castigating "foreign business owners" for expecting to co-exist peacefully with local business owners while not sharing their "trade secrets. " She remarked that "foreigners" cannot "barricade themselves in and not share their practices with local business owners. " 56 The adviser to the Minister speaks openly of the "invasion" of "foreign traders" as an "ongoing sore point. " 57 Further, "foreigners have taken over these markets and even control sectors, such as hair dressing and value chains. Thus, the intermittent explosions against foreigners will continue despite efforts by the government to rendering south africa undesirable: a critique of refugee and informal sector policy pacify the situation. Nobody wants this violence but, let us be frank with each other, locals are not merely going to sit in the corner and sulk. " 58 Recasting refugees and asylum-seekers as "foreigners" is key to this exclusionary discourse. At provincial government level, the national-level antagonism towards refugees and migrants in the informal sector has been repeated. While the 1993 amendment to the Businesses Act empowered provinces to develop dedicated provincial business acts, to date no province has done that. In KwaZulu-Natal (KZN), an informal economy policy process Police shuttered over 600 businesses, detained owners, confiscated stock, imposed fines for trading without permits, and verbally abused the owners.
Affected business owners were informed that "foreigners" were not allowed to operate in South Africa, that their asylum-seeker and refugee permits did not entitle them to run a business, and that they should leave the area. Thirty displaced migrants from Ethiopia were forced to flee when the house they had taken refuge in was fire-bombed.
The Supreme Court noted that police actions "tell a story of the most naked form of xenophobic discrimination and of the utter desperation experienced by the victims of that discrimination. " 64 It also observed that "one is left with the uneasy feeling that the stance adopted by the authorities in relation to the licensing of spaza shops and tuck-shops was in order to induce foreign nationals who were destitute to leave our shores. " At city level, there is a preoccupation with the most visible element of the informal sector -street vendors -who operate in public spaces over which there are often competing interests. Policy statements on street trading or the informal sector show that, on paper, the positive contribution of the informal sector is sometimes recognised. In its street trading policy, the City of Johannesburg, for example, states that "informal trading is a positive development in the micro business sector as it contributes to the creation of jobs and alleviation of poverty and has the potential to expand further the City's economic base. " 66 
The
City of Cape Town's policy advocates a "thriving informal trading sector that is valued and integrated into the economic life, urban landscape and social activities. " 67 The eThekwini Informal Economy policy asserts that the "informal economy makes an important contribution to the economic and social life of Durban. " A recent analysis of Cape Town's approach to street traders shows systematic restriction and exclusion from the inner-city. 72 Township trading is also characterized by long-term neglect. In Khayelitsha, the city council had invested very little in infrastructure for street traders and had devolved the management of street trading to a small group of traders, with negative consequences for many others. 73 Although the policy environment in Cape Town varies across the city and between segments of the informal economy, "the modernist vision of a 'world-class city' with its associated antipathy to informality dominates, and informal space and activity is pathologized. " 74 Migrants and refugees face additional challenges. In an interview for this study, the Cape Town Department of Economic Development claimed that "the City, in terms of its policy around trading, doesn't differentiate and we don't discriminate. There's set criteria in terms of who qualifies (for a trading bay and permit) and how that person qualifies. We don't look at what nationality the person is. " But, as the interviewed official admitted, the City is forced to discriminate in practice because refugees have to produce documentation that South Africans do not. As indicated earlier, the renewal process for asylum and refugee permits is extremely unpredictable in terms of wait times and length granted. One way around this challenge is for South Africans to obtain the permit and then rent the space to refugees at a profit.
The regulation of Somali refugee spaza shops in Cape Town has involved various formal regulatory attempts to control and curtail the operations of Somali businesses including fines, drafting new by-laws, issuing policy statements about foreign shops, and proposing laws to tighten the regulation of the spaza market. For example, a council-approved shopping mall development at the inner-city Warwick Junction transport node threatened 6,000 traders operating there and was only halted by a legal challenge. 77 In 2013, traders in both the inner city and outlying areas identified harassment by the police as their key business challenge. 78 In 2015, traders won a legal case challenging the constitutionality of confiscating their goods, forcing the City to redraft the street-trader by-laws. Again, court action proved to be the only way to secure relief.
CONCLUSION
Distinct from many other refugee-receiving countries, South Africa's rights-based refugee legislation has historically allowed for refugees and asylum-seekers to access a broad array of rights, from health services to education and employment. South Africa has never hosted a dedicated refugee camp or detention centre. In this environment, refugees and asylumseekers have independently found their way into South Africa's social and economic fab- policy direction which is intended to shrink asylum space and further constrain the rights and protections afforded to refugees and asylum-seekers. The White Paper at least acknowledges that the existing policy framework unnecessarily criminalizes migrants from other SADC countries and does propose a set of quota-driven work and trading permits for these migrants, based on recommendations from one of the authors. Whether these proposals will pass muster in a crippling xenophobic environment remains to be seen.
Cumulatively, however, the changes documented in this paper illustrate a significant shift in South Africa's policy for the local integration of refugee populations. By removing the right to work and confining asylum-seekers to detention centres, it is assumed that the flow of asylum-seekers to the country will dry up. This, of course, ignores the growing evidence of the positive economic contribution of refugees and asylum-seekers who, under existing law, are permitted to pursue economic livelihoods. Denial of the existing right of rendering south africa undesirable: a critique of refugee and informal sector policy refugees to seek permanent residence after five years in refugee status is further evidence of the desire to ensure that no refugee remains and is integrated into South African society.
International trends which increasingly stress the positive development impacts of refugee populations are being completely ignored. 79 Rather, the emphasis is on the "exceptionalism" of forced migrants and the need to craft a coercive, non-developmental approach to dealing with refugees. This represents a profound shift in the country's approach to refugee rights, protections, and associated international obligations; moving away from an integration approach towards a containment approach. While the new approach may appear to be a local response to intemperate local demands, it is part of a more global state-led trend that seeks to inhibit access to the physical territory and refugee protection systems of those countries through erecting physical, economic and social barriers to entry.
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While there may be a belief that detention centres will reduce the flow of genuine asylum-seekers to South Africa, there remains a whole set of unanswered questions about whether there will be new policies that directly affect those who have refugee status. There is no indication whether those with refugee status will be denied the right to work, to self-employment, to freedom of movement, and to access health and educational services. Yet, they will not be given any additional resources and will be expected to pursue their own livelihoods, as at present.
To understand the challenges and obstacles that refugees face in securing these livelihoods, it is important to examine the policy and regulatory environment within which those in the informal sector try to survive. Refugees and asylum-seekers confront a formidable set of challenges in operating their informal enterprises in South African cities. 81 At best grudgingly tolerated, and at worst increasingly hounded out of communities by xenophobic mobs and violent entrepreneurship, those fleeing violence and persecution at home certainly do not find a safe haven in South Africa. It is arguable that one of the reasons why the state, and the police in particular, have failed to act against the perpetrators of xenophobic violence, with very low rates of arrest and prosecution, is that xenophobia does serve very practical ends. Not only does it make many South African communities spaces of fear for refugees and asylum-seekers, it also renders the country as a whole an undesirable destination for future refugees. As this report argues, xenophobic violence and police inaction are undoubtedly not the only difficulties that refugees face in the informal sector.
South African city managers oscillate between benign neglect and active destruction of this vibrant and economically productive sector. Migrants who run informal enterprises have migration policy series no. 79 been major targets of a series of national, provincial and local-level "operations" designed to limit or eradicate their businesses from urban space. There is thus a fundamental contradiction between a refugee protection policy that demands self-reliance from refugees and informal sector policies that undermine self-reliance at every turn. To understand the policy environment within which refugees establish and operate their enterprises in South Africa's informal sector, this report brings together two streams of policy analysis. The first concerns the changing refugee policies and the erosion of the progressive approach that characterized the immediate post-apartheid period. The second concerns the informal sector policy, which oscillates between tolerance and attempted destruction at national and municipal levels. While there have been longstanding tensions between foreign and South African informal sector operators, an overtly anti-foreign migrant sentiment has increasingly been expressed in official policy and practice. This report describes the strategies being used to turn South Africa into an undesirable destination for refugees, including the setting up of additional procedural, administrative and logistical hurdles; the undercutting of court judgments affirming the right of asylum-seekers and refugees to employment and self-employment; ensuring that protection is always temporary by making it extremely difficult for refugees to progress to permanent residence and eventual citizenship; and restricting opportunities to pursue a livelihood in the informal sector. The authors conclude that the protection of refugee rights is likely to continue to depend on a cohort of non-governmental organizations prioritizing migrant livelihood rights and being willing and able to pursue time-consuming and costly litigation on their behalf.
